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Abstract 
European economic integration is commonly believed to be incomplete, and that further 
reforms are needed.  In this context, the union of U.S. states is considered the benchmark of 
complete economic integration and is often the basis for comparison regarding the extent of 
E.U economic integration.  Yet, with low trade barriers and with productive factors at least 
notionally mobile across E.U. countries, is the belief that U.S. states are more integrated than 
E.U. member states correct?  To address this question, this paper first develops three 
theoretical predictions about the distribution of output and factors that would arise among 
members of a fully integrated economic area in which goods, capital and labor are freely 
mobile and policies are harmonized.  These theoretical predictions are then empirically tested 
using data on the output and factor stocks of 14 E.U. member states and the 51 U.S. states 
(includes District of Columbia) for the period 1965 to 2000. The empirical results 
convincingly support each theoretical prediction.  Hence, contrary to popular belief, the 
extent of E.U. economic integration is not statistically different from that among U.S. states.  
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On the Extent of Economic Integration: A Comparison of E.U. Countries and U.S. 
States 
The European Union (E.U.) recently turned 50 years of age.  Yet, despite its age and 
recent enlargement to 27 member states, it is commonly believed that the process of 
European integration is both lagging and incomplete, and that many reforms are still needed.  
To many, such reforms would include adoption of a (new) constitution, greater liberalization 
of domestic labor and product markets, and greater cooperation in areas under national 
control like taxation, social security, infrastructure, etc.  In suggesting that further E.U. 
integration is needed, analysts and policymakers often refer explicitly or implicitly to the 
union of U.S. states as the benchmark of complete integration.  Yet, with low barriers to trade 
and with productive factors at least notionally mobile across E.U. member states, how valid is 
the conjecture that U.S. states are more integrated than E.U. countries?  Alternatively, is the 
extent of E.U. economic integration really incomplete?   
The purpose of this paper is to address these questions.  Using factor price 
equalization as a driving force, we derive three theoretical predictions about the expected 
configuration of output and factor stocks among members of a fully integrated economic area 
(IEA) in which goods and factors are freely mobile and policies are harmonized.  We then 
examine empirically for these theoretical predictions with respect to E.U. member states and 
U.S. states.  
We first demonstrate that, within a fully integrated economic area, each member’s 
share of total IEA output will equal its shares of the total IEA stock of each productive factor.  
We label this theoretical result the “equal-share” relationship.  Since this equal-share property 
concerns each IEA member it does not directly address the important question of the 
distribution of output and factor shares across IEA members.  Instead, this question is 
addressed by our second theoretical proposition: the distribution of output and factor shares 
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across IEA members exhibits Zipf’s law.  This law specifies a particular relationship among 
member shares, namely, that the share of e.g. output of the largest member is twice that of the 
second largest member, thrice that of the third largest member, etc.  Our explanation for 
Zipf’s law with respect to the distribution of member shares derives from the expected 
randomness of these shares when policies are fully harmonized across IEA members.  In 
particular, building on Gabaix’s (1999a) analysis of city shares of a nation’s population, we 
argue that if the output and factor shares evolve as geometric Brownian motion with a lower 
bound then the distribution of output and factor shares will exhibit Zipf’s law.   
Finally, given Zipf’s law, we derive our final theoretical proposition: in the long run, 
the distribution of output and factor shares is unique, and is determined only by the number 
of IEA members.  This latter result is significant, since it means that the relative position of 
any one IEA member depends only on the total number of IEA members.   
While our analysis is meant to address the question of the extent of E.U. (and U.S.) 
integration relative to the benchmark of a fully integrated economic area, it also contributes 
more broadly to the largely neglected question of how increased trade and factor mobility 
within integrated economic areas impacts the distribution of output across members, and 
hence the relative economic position of IEA members.  That is, while prior work has 
demonstrated the potentially important role of trade1 and factor mobility2 as influences on 
economic growth, less attention has been given to the distributional consequences of trade 
                                                 
1 An extensive body of work has explored the role of international trade and of factor mobility as mechanisms 
generating endogenous economic growth. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) show that trade 
generally enhances growth, particularly when it facilitates the international transmission of knowledge. 
Similarly, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) show that increased trade due to economic integration may have both 
level and growth effects depending upon the processes by which R&D and information flow across borders.  
Devereux and Lapham (1994) extend Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s model to show that, even without knowledge 
flows, the balanced growth rate when there is free trade in goods alone exceeds that in autarky, provided that 
initial levels of national income differ across countries. 
2 For example, Baldwin and Martin (2004) examine the relationship between growth and the agglomeration of 
economic activity and find that it depends crucially on the extent of capital mobility between regions. Similarly, 
Viaene and Zilcha (2002) show that while complete capital market integration among countries has a positive 
effect on outputs, it does not raise long-run growth rates above autarky values. Instead, these growth rates are 
affected only by parameters that describe the accumulation of human capital. 
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and factor mobility within integrated economic areas. Our analysis therefore contributes by 
investigating properties of integrated economic areas and by deriving a number of testable 
hypotheses regarding output and factor shares within integrated economic areas. 
Finally, in focusing attention on output and factor shares, our analysis also reinforces 
prior developments in the international economics literature that have demonstrated that 
country shares of regional output, or shares of a region’s total supplies of physical capital and 
human capital, are both important and useful constructs (e.g., Bowen et al. (1987), Helpman 
and Krugman (1985), Leamer (1984), Viaene and Zilcha (2002)).  
We empirically examine our theoretical propositions using data on the output and 
factor stocks of each of 14 E.U. countries and each of the 50 U.S. states plus the District of 
Columbia (hereafter the 51 U.S. states).  The data generally covers the period from 1965 to 
2000, which includes the European Union’s internal market program and the introduction of 
the European Monetary Union.3  
For both U.S. states and the E.U. countries, our empirical results convincingly support 
the theoretical predictions of an equal-share relationship and of Zipf’s law, as well as the 
prediction that the actual distribution of output (and of each factor) across IEA members 
conforms (in a statistical sense) with the theoretically expected long run distribution. These 
results therefore indicate that the distribution of output and factors among U.S. states and 
among E.U. countries conform to that expected in a fully integrated economy.  While 
recognizing that some of the statistical tests for the sample of E.U. countries have low power 
due to a smaller number of observations, the results do suggest no significant difference in 
the extent of integration of U.S. states versus E.U. member states. 
                                                 
3 The European Monetary Union (EMU) or ‘Eurozone’ exists since January 1, 1999 and comprises 12 countries: 
Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece (joined 2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  The 14 E.U. countries we examine are the 12 EMU countries excluding 
Luxembourg, plus Denmark, Sweden, and the U.K.  Luxembourg is excluded for lack of data on human capital. 
The omission of Luxembourg is unlikely to affect our results due to the small scale of its economy relative to 
other E.U. countries. 
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The remainder of the paper is as follows.  In Section 1 the theoretical equal-share 
relationship is derived and initial empirical evidence supporting this relationship is presented.  
Section 2 explains the emergence of Zipf’s law for the distribution of output and factor 
shares.  Section 3 presents empirical tests for the presence of Zipf’s law.  Section 4 then uses 
the evidence of Section 3 to further characterize properties of a fully integrated economic 
area.  This includes derivation of the theoretically expected long run distribution of shares, a 
formal test of the equal-share relationship, and tests of the conformity between the actual and 
long run distribution of shares.  Section 5 summarizes and discusses our findings. 
1 Equality of Output and Factor Shares in an Integrated Economic Area 
To demonstrate the equality of output and factor shares we consider an IEA that 
consists of m = 1, …, M members, each producing a single homogenous good by means of a 
constant return to scale aggregate production function of the form: 
(1) ( , )mt m mt mtY F K H  m = 1, …, M 
where Ymt denotes the quantity of the single good produced, Kmt the stock of physical capital, 
and Hmt the stock of human capital, all for country m at time t. The production function is 
assumed to satisfy all the neoclassical assumptions including diminishing marginal 
productivity with respect to each factor. For ease of exposition, the production function is 
assumed to take the Cobb Douglas form:4 
(2) 1m mmt mt mt mtY A K H
   m = 1, …, M,  
Here Amt is a scale parameter and m  is capital’s share of total output. With goods arbitrage 
and free trade a single commodity price will prevail within this IEA. If physical capital and 
labor are perfectly mobile between the M members then we would expect the (value) 
                                                 
4 The Cobb-Douglas specification has wide empirical support (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992).  The analysis can be 
extended to the case where the production function has the constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) form. 
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marginal product of each factor to be equal. In contrast, barriers to capital mobility (e.g. 
corporate income tax differentials, capital controls) or labor mobility (e.g. language, different 
pension systems) would instead create persistent differences in factor rates of returns between 
members. Consider one reference member of the IEA that, without loss of generality, we take 
to be country i.  Let kmt  and hmt  define the proportional difference in rates of return to 
physical capital and to human capital between any country m and reference country i. The 
relation between rates of return to physical capital in the IEA can then be written as: 
(3) 11 1
1
... ...k kt it Mtt M Mt
t it Mt
Y Y Yv v
K K K
      
where m = m/i, implying m = 1 when m = i  (m = 1, ..., M).  Note that for m = i, 1kit   
and .1iv  Likewise, the relation between rates of return to human capital can be written: 
(4) 11 1
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Combining (5) and (6) yields the following relationship between output and factor shares for 
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We term equation (7) the “equal-share relationship.”  This relationship determines the 
distribution of output and factors across the M members of an IEA.  Expression (7) contains 
both observable variables ( , ,mt mt mtY K H ) and unknown parameters ( , , )
k h
m m m   . Differences 
in technology or factor market imperfections imply a multiplicative rescaling of the 
observable variables that is different for each ratio. For example, a difference in ’s leaves 
the observed values (and shares) of physical capital unaffected but transforms the observed 
values of output and human capital in different ways (through vm and m  respectively). If we 
assume that the M members of the IEA share the same technology ( 1m m m     ), and 
that there is costless (perfect) mobility of factors ( 1k hmt mt   ) between members, then we 












  i = 1, …, M 
Hence, with perfect capital mobility and similar technology, each economy’s share of total 
IEA output, and each economy’s share of total IEA physical capital stock, at any date t equals 
its share of the total IEA stock of human capital. 
Relationship (8) has an important implication. It contrasts the policies pursued in 
isolation by any given IEA member with those that are instead pursued jointly (harmonized) 
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across members. For example, (8) does not change when a coordinated education policy by 
all IEA members increases their human capital by the same proportion. In contrast, the same 
policy implemented by only one member would increase that member’s share of total IEA 
human capital (as long as this policy is not imitated by other members). For example Ireland, 
although an E.U member, independently conducted in the 1980s and 1990s a number of 
policies (e.g., low corporate tax rate, education reforms, etc.) that differed significantly from 
those followed by other E.U. member states.  These policies attracted multinationals in key 
sectors to Ireland, particularly from the U.S., and led some E.U. firms to relocate to Ireland.  
At the same time, Ireland’s share of E.U.-15 GDP rose from 0.6% in 1980 to 1.2% in 2000.  
This increase in Ireland’s share of E.U. GDP illustrates the differential impact of harmonized 
versus non-harmonized policies in an integrated economic area on a member country’s share 
of output.  Given its unusual success, E.U. (and OECD) members pressured Ireland to move 
its policies, particularly its tax regime, closer to the E.U. average. 
Hence, if IEA members have harmonized economic and social policies (e.g., fiscal, 
education, industrial policies) then the equal-share property implies that the relative 
performance of each member remains unaffected by these policies.  In this sense, member 
shares can be considered a random variable whose outcome is dependent on the particular 
state of nature at time t. Such randomness can easily be understood from the fact that various 
kinds of random shocks, like discoveries, weather, or natural disasters, including some that 
are specific to a particular member, would give rise to new and different sets of shares for all 
members. 
In Section 3 we report tests of the null hypothesis given by (8) against the alternative 
hypothesis given by (7). As a prelude to that analysis, we provide here a first indication of the 
potential validity of the equal-share relationship by examining a “weak” form of this 
relationship, namely, that there will be conformity between (pair-wise) rankings of the output 
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and factor shares across members of a given integrated area. Table 1 provides evidence of 
this weaker proposition by reporting Spearman rank correlation coefficients for pair-wise 
rankings of the shares of output, physical capital and human capital across members of the 51 
U.S. states and the 14 E.U. countries in 1990, 1995 and 2000, years for which overlapping 
data on output, physical capital and human capital are available.5  All rank correlations are 
positive and significant for both U.S. states and E.U. countries though correlations are higher 
for U.S. states. Results support a “weak” form of the equal-share relationship: that there is 
conformity between (pair-wise) rankings of the output and factor shares across members of 
both integrated areas. 
 
Table 1. Spearman Rank Correlations for Output, Physical Capital and Human Capital 
Shares across U.S. States and E.U. Countries 
 
Spearman Rank Correlation between Shares of Integrated 
Economic Area Year Output and 





1990 0.987 0.977 0.980 
1995 0.991 n.a. n.a. U.S. States a 
2000 0.992 0.981 0.978 
1990 0.956 0.776 0.829 
1995 0.960 0.851 0.837 E.U. Countries b 
2000 0.956 0.820 0.881 
a  N=51 in each year; coefficients whose absolute value exceeds 0.326 are significantly different from  
zero at the 1% level; critical values of the spearman rank correlation tests are obtained from Zar (1972). 
bN=14 in each year, coefficients whose absolute value exceeds 0.626 are significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level; critical values of the tests are obtained from Zar (1972).  
 
 
                                                 
5 For U.S. states our data consists of annual cross-sections covering 1990 to 2000.  For E.U. countries the cross-
sections are instead equally spaced at 5-year intervals and generally cover the period from 1965 to 2000.  
Section 3 gives a complete description of these data. 
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2 Rank-Share Distributions and Zipf’s Law  
Besides the equality of shares for each individual member of a fully integrated 
economy, there is the important question of what determines the distribution of output and 
factor shares among all members of this area. To show this, we consider the concept of rank-
share distribution that describes a particular relationship between the share and rank of a 
variable across a set of observational units. It is related to the concept of a rank-size 
distribution. For instance, a rank-size distribution for city size exists if the relationship 
between the natural logarithm of city size and of rank based on size is linear and exhibits a 
negative slope; Zipf’s law arises when this slope value equals -1.  
The existence of Zipf’s law for city sizes is a widely documented empirical regularity 
(e.g., see Brakman et al. (2001), Fujita et al. (1999), Gabaix (1999b), Gabaix and Ioannides 
(2004) and Eeckhout (2004)). Several explanations have been advanced for the observed 
regularity of Zipf’s law with respect to the distribution of city sizes. Some argue it constitutes 
an optimal spatial pattern that arises when congestion and urbanization externalities interact 
as part of the process of development and growth of cities.  Such forces are usually found in 
core models of urban and regional growth (e.g., see Eaton and Eckstein (1997), Black and 
Henderson (1999), Brakman et al. (1999)).  Others have stressed more mechanical forces that 
often involve a random growth process for city size. A recent example is Gabaix (1999a), 
who draws on Gibrat’s law6 to assume that cities follow a random but common growth 
process. Normalizing city population by a country’s total population, Gabaix shows (his 
Proposition 1) that if population shares evolve as geometric Brownian motion with an 
infinitesimal lower bound then the steady state distribution of population shares will be a 
rank-size distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law. 
                                                 
6 Gibrat’s law (Gibrat, 1931) states that firm growth is independent of firm size.  
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As previously noted, the equal-share property for members of an IEA together with an 
assumed harmonization of IEA members’ economic policies implies that the relative 
performance of any one IEA member can be considered a random variable. Given this, we 
can assume like in Gabaix (1999a) that the share of variable j (e.g., j = output) evolves as 
geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound,7 and moreover, that the distribution of 
growth rates of these shares is common to all IEA members (i.e., Gibrat’s law).8 These 
assumptions imply that the limiting distribution of the shares of variable j across IEA 
members will be a rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law.  
To understand the implications of Zipf’s law, consider again an IEA consisting of M 
members. Let Smj denote member m’s share of the total IEA amount of variable j (j = output 
(y), physical capital (k) or human capital (h)) and let Rmj denote the rank of member m in the 
ranking of shares of variable j across all members (m = 1,…, M). Assume Rmj = 1 for the 
member with the largest share of variable j and Rmj = M for the member with the lowest share 
of variable j. If variable j has a rank-share distribution then we can write:  
(9)   jmj j mjS R   
where j < 0 is the “power-law exponent” and 0 < j < 1 is the share of variable j for the IEA 
member with the highest rank (i.e., when Rmj = 1). A power law implies a specific 
relationship among shares: 1 2 1 3 1/ 2 , / 3 , ... , / M
    j j jj j j j j MjS S S S S S   .  Zipf’s law 
corresponds to j = -1, which simplifies the relationship among member shares, namely: 
S1j = 2S2j = 3S3j = … = MSMj.  This states that the share value of the highest ranked country is 
twice the share value of the second ranked country, etc.  
                                                 
7 One needs to prevent output and factors from falling below some lower bound in order to obtain a power law. 
Otherwise the distribution would be lognormal. A lower bound makes sense in integrated areas as important 
income transfers are institutionalized to prevent states/regions/countries to vanish. For example, the E.U. 
maintains a social fund and a regional fund.  
8 The equal-share relationship implies that the common expected rate of growth is zero since the sum over i of 
the output and factor shares in (8) must be one. 
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To gain insight into how a rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law emerges we 
simulate the evolution of the distribution of output shares across U.S. states, allowing the 
number of years simulated to be 20, 50, 75, 100, 150, 200, 250 and 300.  For each simulation, 
each U.S. state is initially assumed to have same level of output and hence the same share Smy 
(i.e. Smy = 0.0196 = 1/51).  Starting from these common share values, the output shares are 
then specified to evolve randomly over time as geometric Brownian motion with a lower 
bound.9  At annual intervals (t) during a simulation period, the output shares are used as data 
to estimate rank-share equation (9) and to test if the estimated y is statistically different from 
-1.10  This allows us to determine the point in time at which the distribution of output shares 
conforms to a rank-share distribution exhibiting Zipf’s law. 
Our simulations indicate that Zipf’s law emerges after 75 to 150 years depending on 
the assumed volatility of the growth rate of the shares: the higher the volatility, the faster is 
convergence to Zipf’s law.11 Figure 1 summarizes the results of the 200 year simulation by 
showing the evolution of the maximum, median and minimum output share, and the point in 
time after which the distribution of the output shares exhibits, statistically, Zipf’s law.   
 
                                                 
9 Following Gabaix (1999a), each share evolves as dSmyt/Smyt = dt + dBt if Smyt > min(Smyt) where min(Smyt) is 
the lower bound. Alternatively, the increment in each share is dSmyt/Smyt = max[dt + dBt, 0] for 
Smyt  min(Smyt).  Here is a negative drift,   is the standard deviation (volatility), Bt is a Wiener process. 
The term dBt is then the increment of the process, defined in continuous time as dBt = t(dt)1/2.  Since t has zero 
mean and unit standard deviation, E[dBt] = 0 and Var(dBt) =  dt.  The increment dBt is approximated by a 
running sum of 730 discrete increments (“shocks”) since our simulations assume one calendar year is 365 days 
(dt = 1/365) and we arbitrarily assume two random shocks (two draws of t) on each day. We set  = -0.01, 
min(Smyt) = 0.001, and variously,  = 0.04, 0.05 and 0.07.  
10 The estimation procedures used are those detailed in Section 3 below. 
11 On the other hand, with lower volatilities (i.e., 0.01, 0.02 and 0.03) convergence is not obtained even after 300 
years. 
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Figure 1.  Simulated Path of the Maximum, Median and Minimum Output Share 
across 51 U.S. States a 
a Simulation over 200 years assuming that each state begins with the same output share and that the evolution of 
the shares then follows geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound.  For this simulation, drift  = -0.01, 
lower bound min(Smyt) = 0.001, volatility  = 0.07.  The vertical line indicates the starting period at which the 
power law exponent (yt) is no longer significantly different from –1 (Zipf’s law holds).  
 
3 Empirical Analysis 
To formally assess the hypothesis that output and factor shares conform to a rank-
share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law we can take the natural logarithm of each side of 
(9) to obtain: 
(10)    log logmj j j mj mjS R u     1,..., ; , ,m M j y k h   
where j = log(j) < 0 and umj is the error term.  Estimates of the intercept and slope 
parameters in (10) are crucial to our analysis and are obtained by regressing the share of 
variable j on variable j’s rank value across a given set of IEA members.  
13 
We estimate (10) separately for the output share, physical capital share and human 
capital share with respect to the 51 U.S. states and 14 E.U. countries. Given estimates of (10), 
evidence against Zipf’s law is assessed by testing if the estimated slope coefficient is 
significantly different from minus one.  However, as Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) and 
Nishiyama and Osada (2004) recently demonstrate,  both the OLS estimate of j in (10) and 
its associated standard error will be biased downward, with these biases diminishing as the 
number of observational units (M) increases.  Hence, without some correction for these 
inherent biases one is likely to more often reject Zipf’s law when it is in fact true.   
To correct for these biases, we follow Gabaix and Ioannides (2004, p. 10) and 
conduct, for the cases M = 14 (E.U. countries) and M = 51 (U.S. States), a Monte Carlo 
analysis of the OLS slope estimates derived from (10) under the assumption that Zipf’s law 
holds.12  The difference between the Zipf’s law true slope value (-1) and the average of the 
Zipf’s law OLS slope estimates (-1.172 for M = 14 and -1.081 for M = 51) gives an estimate 
of the downward bias, which is 0.172 for M = 14 and 0.081 for M = 51. Given these estimates 
of the bias for each M, an estimate of the true slope coefficient is obtained by adding the 
estimated bias to the OLS estimate derived from (10).  
To obtain a bias adjusted estimate of the standard error we follow Nishiyama and 
Osada (2004) and use the asymptotic approximation to the true standard error of the OLS 
slope estimate given as ˆ 2j M , where ˆ j is the OLS estimate of the slope in (10).13 The 
                                                 
12 Briefly, for a given sample size M (either M = 14 or M = 51), 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations are performed 
drawing from an exact power law with coefficient –1 (Zipf’s Law).  This involved drawing M i.i.d. variables vm, 
uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], and then constructing sizes Lm = 1/vm.  The sizes Lm are then 
normalized into shares Sm that were then ordered and assigned a rank value Rm.  We then perform 100,000 OLS 
regressions using the specification log(Sm) =  +  log(Rm) + ui. The complete results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
13 Another method for estimating the parameters of a power law distribution is the maximum likelihood Hill 
estimator (Hill, 1975).  However, as Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) remark, the properties of the Hill estimator in 
finite samples can be "very worrisome," and in particular their theoretical results predict a large bias in 
parameter estimates and associated standard errors in small samples.  We computed the Hill estimators (results 
not shown) and indeed found very high downward biases in both parameter estimates and standard errors.   
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test statistic formed using these bias corrected values has asymptotically a normal distribution 
(Nishiyama and Osada, 2004). 
Data  
 Our data set consists of data in a given year on the output and stocks of human and 
physical capital for the 51 U.S. states and for 14 E.U. countries. Due to limitations on 
sourcing data for human capital, the data on U.S. states are restricted to annual observations 
from 1990 to 2000. The data for E.U. countries are restricted to consist of observations 
equally spaced at 5 year intervals over the period 1960 to 2000.  The following provides more 
details regarding data methods and sources.   
 For U.S. states, output for the period 1990 to 2000 is measured by real gross state 
product as reported annually by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.14 For E.U. countries, 
output is measured by real gross domestic product (GDP), derived from data on real GDP per 
capita and population given in the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2002).  
For both U.S. states and E.U. countries, the human capital stock is measured by the 
number of persons with at least secondary level of education. For U.S. states, data on 
educational attainment by state are taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.15 These data 
are available only every 10 years, which limit the data on human capital for U.S. states to two 
years: 1990, and 2000.   
For the E.U. countries, human capital stock is measured by multiplying the percentage 
of the population having at least a secondary level of education times a country’s total 
population.  Data on rates of educational attainment are taken from Barro and Lee (1993, 
                                                 
14 Data on gross state product available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp 
15 Decennial census dataset are available at http://factfinder.census.gov 
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1996, and 2000); country population data are from Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).16 The 
educational attainment data are only available every 5 years, which limit the E.U. data on 
human capital to five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000.   
 Annual estimates of U.S. state physical capital stocks from 1990 to 2000 are derived 
from BEA (2002) estimates of the total U.S. physical capital stock in each of nine one-digit 
industrial sectors that together comprise all economic activity.17 The national industry 
physical capital stocks are allocated to each state by multiplying an industry’s total capital 
stock18 by the industry’s contribution to a state’s total income.19 For each state, these industry 
capital stock estimates are then summed to obtain an estimate of a state’s total stock of 
physical capital.20 The calculation performed for each state m at time t can be expressed as  
9
1








In this equation, kmt is the stock of physical capital in state m, ymjt  is industry j’s value 
added in state m (m = 1, …, 51), Ymt is total value added in state m, and Kjt  is the national 
physical capital stock in industry j (j = 1,…, 9).  This procedure assumes the capital-to-output 
ratio within industry j (i.e., kmjt/ymjt) is the same across U.S. states, that is, kmjt/ymjt = Kmt/Ymt.  
Estimates of E.U. country physical capital stocks for the period 1965 to 1990 are 
constructed by multiplying the Penn World Tables 5.6 (Heston and Summers, 1991a and 
1991b) data on population, physical capital stock per worker and real GDP per capita and 
then dividing the result by real GDP per worker.  Timmer et al. (2003) provides data on E.U. 
                                                 
16 Other studies using the Barro-Lee data include Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Barro 
(1999), Easterly and Levine (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
17 The sectors (BEA code) are Farming (81), Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other (100); Mining 
(200); Construction (300); Manufacturing (400); Transportation(500); Wholesale and retail trade (610); Finance, 
insurance and real estate (700); and Services (800). 
18  Data on state physical capital stocks by industry were taken from U.S. Fixed Assets Tables, available at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb 
19 Annual data on state value added available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi 
20 This procedure follows that used by Munnel (1990) and Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). 
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country physical capital stocks for 1980-2000.21  These data for 1995 and 2000 are combined 
with the computed estimates for 1965-1990 to yield data on physical capital stocks at five 
year intervals between 1965 to 2000, inclusive.22 
Results 
Table 2 reports the OLS and bias corrected estimates of (10) for the share of output, 
physical capital and human capital for the sample of U.S. states; Table 3 reports OLS and 
bias corrected estimates for the sample of E.U. countries.23  Over all results, the adjusted R-
squares range from 0.791 to 0.945 indicating a strong relationship between the share and rank 
of each variable.   
For U.S. States, the column labeled “Bias Corrected Slope” in Table 2 reports the 
estimated slope value corrected for bias expected when OLS is used to estimate (10).  Based 
on this bias corrected slope value, the column labeled “Z-statistic Testing Slope = -1” 
indicates strong support for the hypotheses that the output and factor shares for U.S. states 
conform to a rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law; in no instance can we reject (at 
the 5% level) the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is significantly different from –1. This 
is strong evidence that, for U.S. States, each of the three share distributions exhibit Zipf’s 
law.  
Empirical results for E.U countries are reported in Table 3. As for U.S. States , the 
column labeled “Bias Corrected Slope” gives the estimated slope value corrected for the bias 
that arises when we estimate (10) by OLS. Given this, the column labeled “Z-statistic Testing 
Slope = -1” shows that in no instance can we reject (at 5% level) the hypothesis that the slope 
coefficient is significantly different from -1. This also strongly supports the hypotheses that  
                                                 
21 Physical capital database available at http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.shtml 
22 Estimation was conducted using both sets of data for E.U. countries.  No qualitative difference in results was 
found for the years in which data were available from both sources (i.e., 1980, 1985 and 1990).  For these three 
years we therefore report only the results using the capital stock data from Timmer et al. (2003). 
23 The standard errors associated with the OLS estimates are “robust” in the sense of White (1980). 
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Table 2.  OLS and Bias Corrected Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for U.S. 
States 
 












1990 -1.179 (0.248) -1.101  (0.081) -1.020 -0.092 0.887
1991 -1.194 (0.248) -1.093  (0.081) -1.012 -0.055 0.884
1992 -1.199 (0.252) -1.090  (0.082) -1.009 -0.042 0.883
1993 -1.207 (0.258) -1.085  (0.084) -1.004 -0.019 0.881
1994 -1.208 (0.265) -1.084  (0.086) -1.003 -0.014 0.876
1995 -1.209 (0.265) -1.083  (0.086) -1.002 -0.009 0.874
1996 -1.205 (0.267) -1.085  (0.087) -1.004 -0.019 0.872
1997 -1.192 (0.271) -1.091  (0.088) -1.010 -0.046 0.868
1998 -1.173 (0.272) -1.100  (0.088) -1.019 -0.087 0.868





2000 -1.164 (0.266) -1.106  (0.087) -1.025 -0.114 0.868
1990 -1.199 (0.246) -1.092  (0.080) -1.011 -0.051 0.892
1991 -1.207 (0.247) -1.089  (0.080) -1.008 -0.037 0.891
1992 -1.200 (0.251) -1.092  (0.081) -1.011 -0.051 0.892
1993 -1.197 (0.257) -1.093  (0.083) -1.012 -0.055 0.890
1994 -1.196 (0.266) -1.092  (0.086) -1.011 -0.051 0.884
1995 -1.173 (0.275) -1.102  (0.089) -1.021 -0.096 0.879
1996 -1.168 (0.276) -1.105  (0.089) -1.024 -0.110 0.878
1997 -1.126 (0.286) -1.125  (0.093) -1.044 -0.198 0.870
1998 -1.126 (0.283) -1.126  (0.091) -1.045 -0.202 0.876






2000 -1.093 (0.282) -1.143  (0.091) -1.062 -0.274 0.880
1990 -1.244 (0.280) -1.064  (0.091) 
-0.983 0.081 0.854 Human Capital 
Share 
(M=51) 2000 -1.264 (0.293) -1.054  (0.096) 
-0.973 0.129 0.839 
 
a OLS standard errors in parentheses.  All intercept coefficients significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
b OLS standard errors in parentheses.  All slope coefficients significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
c Computed as the OLS slope estimate plus  0.081 (the bias). 
d Computed as the OLS slope estimate plus  0.081 (the bias) minus –1 divided by the asymptotic approximation 
of the true standard error (given as minus the OLS slope estimate times 0.198 = (2/51)0.5). All slope coefficients 
are not significantly different from –1 at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.  OLS and Bias Corrected Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for E.U. 
Countries 
 












1960 -0.645 (0.397) -1.461  (0.192) -1.289 -0.523 0.908
1965 -0.665 (0.416) -1.435  (0.204) -1.263 -0.485 0.889
1970 -0.699 (0.433) -1.406  (0.212) -1.234 -0.440 0.867
1975 -0.742 (0.435) -1.366  (0.211) -1.194 -0.376 0.859
1980 -0.755 (0.419) -1.357  (0.202) -1.185 -0.361 0.870
1985 -0.763 (0.417) -1.354  (0.199) -1.182 -0.356 0.872
1990 -0.772 (0.420) -1.346  (0.198) -1.174 -0.342 0.872





* -1.272  (0.170) -1.100 -0.208 0.885
1965 -0.816 (0.417) -1.293  (0.217) -1.121 -0.248 0.851
1970 -0.825 (0.396) -1.275  (0.208) -1.103 -0.214 0.858
1975 -0.836 (0.388)
* -1.262  (0.203) -1.090 -0.189 0.858
1980 -0.760 (0.484) -1.332  (0.245) -1.160 -0.318 0.828
1985 -0.732 (0.404)
 * -1.358  (0.205) -1.186 -0.362 0.870
1990 -0.670 (0.398) -1.418  (0.206) -1.246 -0.459 0.873





2000 -0.658 (0.382) -1.431  (0.186) -1.259 -0.479 0.904
1960 -0.147 (0.448) -2.103  (0.287) -1.931 -1.171 0.791
1965 -0.343 (0.341) -1.890  (0.184) -1.718 -1.005 0.880
1970 -0.529 (0.280)
 * -1.639  (0.176) -1.467 -0.754 0.865
1975 -0.642 (0.236)
 ** -1.518  (0.126) -1.346 -0.603 0.928
1980 -0.683 (0.239)
 ** -1.433  (0.122) -1.261 -0.482 0.933
1985 -0.747 (0.185)
 ** -1.409  (0.092) -1.237 -0.445 0.945
1990 -0.895 (0.191)
 ** -1.241  (0.112) -1.069 -0.147 0.912
1995 -0.897 (0.201)






 ** -1.215  (0.110) -1.043 -0.094 0.919
 
a OLS standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at ** = p < 0.05 or *  = p < 0.10. 
b OLS standard errors in parentheses.  All slope coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
c Computed as the OLS slope estimate plus 0.172 (the bias). 
d Computed as the OLS slope estimate plus 0.172 (the bias) minus  –1 divided by the asymptotic approximation 
of the true standard error (given as minus the OLS slope estimate times 0.3779 = (2/14)0.5). All slope 
coefficients are not significantly different from –1 at the 5% level. 
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the output and factor shares for E.U. countries conform to a rank-share distribution that 
exhibits Zipf’s law.  
These findings for U.S. states and for E.U. countries are striking empirical results. For 
comparison, we preformed the same analysis and tests (results not shown) with respect to a 
grouping of 30 developing countries as well as a “world” of 55 countries and found no 
evidence to support Zipf’s law at the usual levels of significance. 
4 Further Characterization of Integrated Economic Areas 
The empirical findings of the preceding section support the prediction that the 
distribution of shares across IEA members will conform to Zipf’s law.  An important 
assumption underlying this prediction is the equal-share relationship in (8).  In this section, 
we test the empirical validity of this crucial assumption.  In addition, we derive and test the 
proposition that, when Zipf’s law holds, the limiting distribution of output or factor shares 
across IEA members is determined only by the number of IEA members. 
The Equal-Share Relationship 
A strong test for the equal-share relationship involves the null hypothesis given by equation 
(8) against the alternative hypothesis given by (7). Evidence in favor of the equal-share 
relationship is obtained in two steps.  First one tests for homogeneity of the OLS slope 
estimates (i.e., whether y = k = h) to verify that the distributions of shares come from a 
common power-law distribution.  Second, one tests for intercept homogeneity across the 
three share equations (i.e., whether y = k = h) to examine if the equal-share relationship 
holds with respect to the highest ranked member of each IEA (i.e., California for U.S. states 
and Germany for E.U. countries). Failure to reject the null hypothesis would imply that 
technological differences and factor market imperfections are not strong enough to prevent 
the equal-share relationship from holding in a statistical sense. 
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Table 4 reports p-values for testing the hypotheses of slope and intercept homogeneity 
across the three share distributions in each sample year.24 For U.S. states we cannot reject the 
hypotheses of intercept equality and slope equality in either of the two years for which data 
were available on all three shares (1990 and 2000). This result supports the equal-share 
relationship for U.S. states. The results for E.U. countries also indicate support for the equal-
share relationship. We remark that the slope homogeneity tests use the OLS slope estimates 
uncorrected for bias. However, correcting for the expected downward bias would only 
strengthen support for the equal-share relationship found here. 
 
Table 4.  Results Testing the Equal-Share Relationship 
 
p-values testing coefficient 
equality across equations Region Year 
Intercept Slope 
1990 0.9680 0.9014 
U.S. States 
2000 0.8241 0.5964 
1965 0.6063 0.0445 a 
1970 0.8011 0.2797 
1975 0.8619 0.3655 
1980 0.9689 0.8461 
1985 0.9969 0.9305 
1990 0.8111 0.6034 
1995 0.7124 0.3697 
E.U. Countries 
2000 0.7291 0.4072 
                                a Cross-equation homogeneity rejected at 5% level. 
                                                 
24 These tests were performed by establishing, in each year, a system comprising the three share equations but 
without initially imposing any cross-equation parameter restrictions. 
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Limiting Distribution of Shares  
Let Vmj denote the level of variable j for member m. Assume, without loss of 
generality, that member 1 has the highest value of variable j and let mj be member m’s value 
of variable j relative to that of member 1 (i.e., mj = Vmj / V1j), so that 1j = 1. Now order the 
values of variable j in descending order. This ordering of the values of variable j across the 
m = 1, …, M members can be written:  
 V1j  2j V1j  3j V1j  .. Mj V1j . 
Since the total IEA amount of variable j is then (1 + 2j + 3j + …+ Mj)V1j,  implies the 
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Expressions (12) indicate that the sequence of shares Smj is a Harmonic series, where 
each share value Smj depends on the values of the δ’s and the number of members M.  
Accepting our preceding empirical evidence that the distribution of shares exhibits Zipf’s law 
then 2j = 1/2, 3j = 1/3, 4j = 1/4, etc., then the theoretical shares in (12) depend only on the 
number of IEA members and therefore can be computed once the number of members (M) is 
specified.  For example, the theoretical share values for the M = 51 U.S. states are: 0.2213, 
0.1106, 0.0738, 0.0553, …, 0.0043.   For the M = 14 E.U. countries the theoretical share 
values are: 0.3075, 0.1538, 0.1025, 0.0769, …, 0.0220. 
22 
To test whether observed shares conform to those theoretically expected using (12), 
Table 5 reports simple correlations between the natural logarithms of the actual and expected 
shares for U.S. states and E.U countries in 1990 and 2000. The correlations range from 
0.9176 to 0.9619 and all are highly significant, indicating a strong positive relationship 
between actual and theoretical shares. 
 
Table 5.  Correlation between Logarithm of Actual and Theoretical Output and  
Factor Shares for U.S. States and E.U. Countries, 1990 and 2000 
 
Correlation between Logarithms of Actual and 
Theoretical Shares Integrated Economic 
Area 
Year 
Output Physical Capital Human Capital 
1990 0.9429 0.9456 0.9258 
U.S. States 
2000 0.9332 0.9393 0.9176 
1990 0.9392 0.9397 0.9397 E.U. 
Countries 2000 0.9453 0.9548 0.9619 
 
 
 These simple correlations indicate a significant association among shares, but they do 
not indicate overall conformity of the actual and theoretical share distributions, that is, 
whether the actual and expected shares come from the same distribution. To test this, we use 
the non-parametric two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In this test, the null hypothesis is 
that both sets of shares come from a common distribution against the alternative hypothesis 
that they do not. The results, shown in Table 6, convincingly fail to reject the null hypothesis, 










Table 6.  Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests between Actual and Theoretical 
Output and Factor Shares 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-Statistic between Actual Shares 
and Theoretical Shares a Integrated Economic 
Area 
Year 
Output Physical Capital Human Capital 
1990 0.2157** 0.2157** 0.2353** 
U.S. States 
2000 0.2353** 0.2745* 0.2157** 
1990 0.3571** 0.3571** 0.3571** E.U. 
Countries 2000 0.3571** 0.3571** 0.2143** 
** Cannot reject that shares come from a common distribution at 5% level. 
a Unable to reject that both the actual and theoretical shares come from a common distribution if the D-
statistic is lower than a critical value; for U.S. states this critical value is 0.3228 at 1% level and 0.2693 at 5% 
level; for E.U. countries, this critical value is 0.6161 at 1% level and 0.5140 at 5% level. 
 
5 Summary and Discussion 
In response to the perception that the process of European integration is lagging or is 
incomplete, this paper derived three theoretical predictions about the distribution of output 
and factors among members of a fully integrated economic area in which goods and factors 
are mobile and member polices are harmonized.  These predictions were then empirically 
tested with respect to the 51 U.S. states and 14 E.U. countries, using data that generally 
covered the period from 1965 to 2000.  In all cases, the data strongly supported the 
theoretical prediction of an equal-share relationship for each country, and the prediction that 
the distribution of output and factor shares across countries exhibit’s Zipf’s law.  Moreover, 
for each bloc, no statistically significant difference was found between the actual distribution 
of output (and of each factor) and the theoretically predicted long run distribution.  Together, 
these results indicate that E.U. countries and U.S. states can each be regarded as fully 
integrated economic areas. However, some of the statistical tests based on E.U. data may 
have lower power due to a lower number of observations. 
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The results suggest that the extent of economic integration among E.U. member states 
is greater than commonly believed. They suggest that past E.U. commitments to the freer 
movement of goods and factors, together with major transformations like the 1992 internal 
market program and the introduction of the European Monetary Union, have been effective in 
allocating resources within and between E.U. members.  If so, the results also suggest that 
perceptions of lagging or incomplete E.U. integration may instead reflect that resource 
allocation within the E.U. is non-optimal from the perspective of world resource allocation 
(Bowen and Sleuwaegen, 2004) due to policies such as the common agricultural policy. 
The empirical significance of the equal-share relationship and of Zipf’s law stress that 
policy harmonization is consistent with the proposition that the relative growth performance 
of individual IEA members is largely random.  Hence, random shocks like innovations, 
discoveries, weather, or natural disasters, including some that are specific to a particular 
member, would give rise to different sets of shares and affect the relative position of 
members.  This randomness is more likely the greater the extent of policy harmonization, and 
hence more likely if members do not run independent monetary or exchange rate policies, 
when fiscal policies are constrained by institutions, when education systems are harmonized, 
and when successful local industrial policies are rapidly imitated.  All this points to the need 
to recognize the potential constraint that greater E.U. policy harmonization imposes on 
member states: no member state can or should expect to improve its relative position unless it 
undertakes independent, inharmonious policies (e.g., Ireland).  
Finally, in addition to addressing the question of the extent of E.U. economic 
integration, our analysis has contributed more broadly to the literature on the effects of 
increased trade and factor mobility that have implications for the characterization of 
integrated economic areas in general.  For example, if the equal-share relationship holds, then 
all members of an integrated economic area will have the same output per efficiency unit of 
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labor (i.e., human capital).  This implication is the essence of the absolute convergence 
hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Papyrakis and Gerlah (2007)), here interpreted in 
terms of efficiency units of labor, not in per capita terms.  The equal-share relationship also 
addresses Lucas’ (1990) question as to why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries.  
Namely, economies with a low level (and hence low share) of human capital would also be 
expected to have a low share of physical capital as well as a low output share. 
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